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Peacocke's characterization of what he calls implicit conceptions 
recognizes the significance of a subset of contentful states in making 
rational behavior intelligible. What Peacocke has to offer in this 
paper is an account of (i) why we need implicit conceptions; (ii) how 
we can discover them; (iii) what they explain; (iv) what they are; 
and (v) how they can help us to better understand some issues in 
the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. The rationalist 
tradition in which Peacocke's project ought to be located is 
concerned with the nature of understanding. His notion of implicit 
conceptions is invoked to explain non-straightforwardly inferential 
but rational patterns of concept-involving behavior. We come to 
know about implicit conceptions because we treat the thinker's 
practices as having a certain representational content. They are 
implicit in what the thinker does.  
 I intend to focus on the question of what implicit conceptions 
are (although in doing so some of the other aspects will also come to 
the fore). I will argue for the following position: that —even at the 
personal level— certain inferential principles underlie the process 
that leads to the thinker's reliably differential responses and that 
subsequently point us in the direction of a notion such as that of an 
implicit conception. More precisely, I will argue that practical 
inferential processes are involved in the understanding-based 
capacities that support our ascription of personal-level implicit 
conceptions to the thinker. If I am right, then Peacocke's implicit 
conceptions don't preclude acceptance of personal-level conceptual-
role theories because that practical inferential articulation, i.e. that 
conceptual role, is the implicit conception itself1. 
 
 
                                                
1 The notion of conceptual role as inferential role that I have in 
mind is the one developed by Robert Brandom (1994) following 
Sellars' original ideas (1963). 
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2. What Implicit Conceptions are and What They 
Are Not. 
 
 Before the presentation of my argument, it might be helpful to 
rehearse what I take to be the key positive and negative features of 
implicit conceptions. On the positive side, we find (i) that implicit 
conceptions are understanding-based capacities that the thinker 
possesses and that lead her to the rational acceptance of certain 
principles and statements; (ii) that implicit conceptions are content-
involving states (even though the thinker need not have any explicit 
knowledge of those contents); (iii) that they play an explanatory 
role in particular patterns of semantic evaluation and of object and 
property recognition and also a justificational role in the thinker's 
rational acceptance of primitive (logical) principles; (iv) that they 
involve concepts whose explicit characterization by a speaker can be 
incorrect without affecting the correctness of the implicit content; 
(v) that implicit conceptions are fundamentally tied to judgments 
about particular cases; and finally (vi) that implicit conceptions are 
concepts whose legitimacy can't be defended. 
 On the negative side, we are told that (i) implicit conceptions 
are not concepts for which the thinker has only a partial 
understanding of the expression. The thinker doesn't defer in her 
use of the expression to others in the community who understand it 
better; (ii) that implicit conceptions are not tacit or virtual beliefs. 
(iii) that they are not inferential dispositions; (iv) that implicit 
conceptions are not rules in Wittgenstein's sense; and finally (v) that 
the rational, justified acceptance of new principles involving a given 
concept precludes the idea that implicit conceptions can be 
characterized —at the personal level— in terms of their conceptual 
role. 
 Two caveats. First, the position that I am about to defend 
should not be taken as one in which implicit conceptions are just 
dispositions to correctly apply concepts in central cases. I agree with 
Peacocke that the classification of particular stimuli as instances of a 
general kind by the exercise of regular differential responsive 
dispositions may be a necessary condition of concept use, but it is 
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certainly not a sufficient one. Second, I also agree that in order for a 
thinker to count as having what Peacocke characterizes as implicit 
conceptions, he or she need not inferentially justify her claim, or 
her acceptance, or her recognition. The claim that —even at the 
personal-level— practical inferential processes are involved in the 
understanding-based capacities that support our ascription of 
implicit conception to the thinker doesn't imply that those 
inferential processes play a justificational role for the thinker, but 
only for the theorist who performs the ascription. 
 
 
3. My Implicit Conception of Implicit 
Conceptions. 
 
 My contention is that for a reliably differential response to be 
a candidate for the expression of knowledge of the content of an 
implicit concept, the thinker who behaves according to the 
possession of that concept must have some grip on its role in 
reasoning. Otherwise implicit conceptions could not be 
characterized as understanding-based capacities at all. They 
couldn't be characterized this way because part of what 'being 
rational' means in this context involves displaying states, attitudes 
and practices that are liable to normative assessment. In other 
words, to be a thinker (rather than a mere behaver) is to be 
involved in a web of structured activity with a normative dimension. 
The movement of thought —as Peacocke likes to phrase the point— 
in which the rational thinker is engaged need not involve inference. 
But inference of a practical kind is indeed involved in grasping the 
normative force of such non inferentially acquired knowledge. That 
practical kind of inference is what takes the thinker from e.g. the 
utterance of a sentence such as 'This is a chair' to the acceptance of 
a commitment to the effect that there is a chair there. 
 What I mean by the thinker having 'some grip on the concept's 
role in reasoning' is thus something like this. In order to count as a 
thinker and not a mere behaver, the agent must embrace, even in 
non inferential applications of the concept, certain normatively 
 5 
pregnant attitudes whose manifestation is a commitment to act in a 
certain (rational) way. This reflection suggests that the content-
involving implicit conceptions underlying the normative aspect 
embedded in the thinker's rational commitments can only be 
specified by the conceptual role they play in accounting for her 
behavior. The inferential commitment is, then, precisely the 
conceptual role of the thinker's implicit conception. As Peacocke's 
main argument against the plausibility of personal conceptual-role 
theories in accounting for implicit conceptions is based on the 
thinker's rational and justified acceptance of new principles 
involving a given concept, I'll now concentrate on that issue. 
 Let's re-consider the case of classical negation, a case that 
Peacocke examines in order to show how a personal-level 
conceptual-role theorist might treat the phenomenon of new 
principles. He claims that the personal-level conceptual-role theorist 
might  
 
'  ...  include the classical logical inferential principles for 
negation: that from ~ ~ A one can infer A, and that if one can 
derive a contradiction from A, one can infer ~ A. Yet again it 
seems clear that these classical logical rules for negation (and 
their instances) are ones whose correctness can be, and needs 
to be, attained by rational reflection from some prior 
understanding of negation ... The implicit conception 
associated with the understanding of negation simply links the 
expression for negation with these already appreciated falsity 
conditions'. 
 
(p. 20 of manuscript. My emphasis). 
 
 Now, what is the nature of that link? It seems to me that the 
link Peacocke is talking about has an inferential character of the 
kind I am advocating here, i.e., that to know the truth-, and 
therefore the falsity-conditions of a sentence already involves the 
sort of normative commitment that is conferred on that sentence by 
the role it plays in the thinker's practices. I grant Peacocke's point 
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that the movement of thought in which a rational thinker is engaged 
when coming to appreciate the meaning-determining role for 
classical negation cannot be explained as a result of her having 
explicitly inferred it from logical inferential principles. My point is 
that the understanding of the meaning-determining role for classical 
negation and its being a potential manifestation of knowledge 
couldn't be correctly ascribed to the thinker without her having 
implicitly inferred it from the implicit knowledge embedded in her 
rational practices (especially those that contain the connective 
involved, i.e., negation). 
 To invoke an implicit conception of negation in personal-level 
conceptual-role terms doesn't thus necessarily involve the need to 
appeal to the logical inferential principles that Peacocke has in 
mind, but it does require an appeal to features of the use of that 
expression that are inferential in a different sense, a sense that 
affects even our understanding of the truth-conditions of a claim 
that does not contain a negation. To see how this works one only 
has to change the terms of the link that Peacocke mentions —the 
link between the expression for negation and the already 
appreciated falsity conditions— and say, as e.g. Brandom does, that 
since 'the content of a claim can be represented by the set of claims 
that are incompatible with it' (Brandom, 1994, p. 115), its formal 
negation can be analyzed as ' ... the claim that is entailed [my 
emphasis] by each one of the claims incompatible with the claim of 
which it is the negation' (Brandom, 1994, p. 115). This 
characterization of our grasp of negation involves an implicit 
conception, but one whose correctness can only be appreciated by 
paying attention to the personal-level conceptual role it plays in 
rational practice. 
 The move I am making here might sound too close to one that 
Peacocke tries to undermine in his paper. It might sound like a 
proposal that Peacocke himself made in his earlier work, and that 
consists, basically, in saying that the rationally appreciated 
correctness of new principles ' ... is fixed by those [other principles] 
which are mentioned in the conceptual role in some less direct way' 
(p. 21 of manuscript. My emphasis). He points out that this strategy 
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leaves three problems unresolved. One is that the strategy cannot be 
applied to the 'ordinary' thinker. The second is that the strategy 
lacks the initial materials on which it needs to operate because there 
are cases in which all of the inference rules distinctive of a concept 
have to be worked out by a thinker. Finally, according to Peacocke, 
the strategy gives no rationale for the requirement itself. 
 However, I don't think these problems arise for the strategy 
proposed here. Firstly, the practical inferential capacity of the 
thinker to engage in rational behavior involving negation is not to 
be identified with mastery of a logical calculus, but rather with the 
usual understanding of sentences (even those not containing 
negation). This is certainly something we should concede to the 
'ordinary' thinker.  
 Secondly, the case in which all the inference rules distinctive 
of a concept have to be worked out by a thinker is not a case that 
applies to the concept of negation as it has been characterized in 
our practical inferential treatment. The reason is again that some of 
those inferences are already present in the understanding of any 
claim and, furthermore, they are already embedded in any other 
kind of non-linguistic behavior that deserves to be called rational. 
Also, as a general point, I doubt very much that there are cases —
other than stipulations involved in newly introduced symbols— in 
which all of the inference rules for a concept have to be worked out 
by the thinker. 
 Finally, the strategy does give a rationale for the requirement 
of appealing to the inferentially articulated attitudes underlying 
understanding-based capacities (although certainly not to 
Peacocke's requirement which is the need to invoke the strongest 
semantical assignment that validates some introduction rule 
mentioned in the conceptual role). The rationale, one that can be 
found already in Frege and in a more elaborate way in Dummett (Cf. 
Dummett, 1973), is that these understanding-based capacities need 
to account both for the circumstances under which they are 
correctly applied or used and the appropriate consequences of their 
application (Cf. Brandom, 1994, p. 117). 
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 I think the same strategy can be applied to implicit 
conceptions that lie outside the logical or mathematical domain, i.e., 
that understanding-based capacities implicitly involve a practical 
inferential commitment even in the case of empirical concepts that 
are mainly used in perception and observational reports. To say 
this, however, is not much of a criticism, as Peacocke himself 
acknowledges that the possession of those concepts may be 
explained in terms of conceptual-roles as long as they are 
characterized in psychofunctionalist terms and adds that '[n]othing 
I have said tells against psycho-conceptual-role theories of meaning 
and content' (p. 20 of manuscript). Now, the central point of my 
argument is that nothing of what Peacocke has said tells against 
personal-level conceptual role theories either. As a result, it seems 
hard to discern any residual deep difference between a conceptual-
role characterization of implicit conceptions —both at the personal 
and subpersonal level— and the one that Peacocke is now 
defending. But, of course, it might just be that the reason the 
difference seems elusive is that I still possess only an implicit 
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